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The recent financial turmoil in emerging markets after the debacle of Mexico’s
stabilization/reform program in December 1994 has raised many challenging questions.  One of
these questions is whether emerging markets would benefit from a wider use of “derivatives” and
access to state-contingent contracts.1
The present paper discusses a simple analytical framework in which the key uncertainty
facing the private sector is whether or not policymakers will be able or willing to carry out
economic reform.  This is a major challenge for reformers.  Aside from the inherent difficulties
of charting new waters, reformers also face a private sector that is aware of these difficulties and,
thus, is sensitive to the possibility that reforms may fail.   To illustrate these issues, the paper
considers two types of reforms: (1) output-enhancing reform and (2) trade liberalization.  The
former can be thought as being associated with institutional changes that help to garner the
economy’s productive potential (e.g., deregulation, anti-trust legislation, privatization, etc).  On
the other hand, under trade liberalization, the paper studies a situation in which the government
announces a permanent reduction in import tariffs.  A key assumption, however, will be that
reforms are not fully credible, because the public attaches a positive probability that they will be
abandoned.  There is, therefore, room for state-contingent contracts, or, more specifically,
contracts contingent on the maintenance of reform.2  To sharpen the focus, the paper will abstract
from any other source of uncertainty.
The model assumes that domestic residents are identical and, hence, the only risk-sharing
opportunities involve foreign investors.  The latter are risk neutral, while domestic residents are
risk averse.  Although the benchmark case is one in which both domestic residents and foreign
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investors exhibit the same beliefs about the implementation of reform, the paper also analyzes
the implications of a discrepancy between the beliefs of these two types of agents.   
The paper shows that, in all relevant cases, greater credibility of reform programs leads to
higher social welfare–thus, confirming the view that enhancing the credibility of reform should
be one of government’s first priorities.  The paper’s main objective, however, is to examine the
role of state-contingent markets, which is the realm of modern financial engineering.  In this
respect, the central result is that implications are radically different depending on the type of
reform.  The paper shows that if the government utilizes domestic resident’s probabilities to
evaluate social expected utility, then there is no room for welfare-improving intervention in the
context of output-enhancing reform.  However, the paper also shows that, if trade liberalization is
not fully credible, even the absence of state-contingent markets welfare-dominates complete
markets in a wide set of relevant situations–thus providing a rationale for government
intervention.  Moreover, if the government is “paternalistic” and utilizes its own probabilities of
reform’s failure in evaluating social expected utility, there is room for welfare-improving
intervention even in the output-enhancing reform case.
The paper offers some comments on endogenous reform when reform is socially costly. 
It is shown that complete markets in the output-enhancing reform case (with domestic residents
and foreign investors sharing the same view about the chances of reform’s failure) may remove
all incentives for reform to be carried out, because in that case domestic residents would be fully
insured against policy changes.  This is a dramatic example in which complete markets may
interfere with the will and determination of policymakers to carry out reform to full fruition.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses output-enhancing reform, while
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Section III examines trade liberalization; Section IV studies endogenous reform and moral
hazard; the paper is closed with conclusions in Section V.
II.  Output-Enhancing Reform
The main points of this note can be made in terms of a two-period model with no capital
accumulation.  Consumption and output ‘today’ are indicated by c and yL, respectively, while
consumption and output ‘tomorrow’ in state of nature s are denoted by xs and ys, respectively. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume two states of nature: L (for “Low”)  and H (for “High”),
such that yH > yL.  Thus, this situation can be interpreted as one in which ‘today’ the government
undertakes an economic reform program which, if successful and carried out into ‘tomorrow,’
results in higher output than ‘today’ (since yH > yL).  The utility function satisfies the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, is intertemporally separable, strictly concave, and exhibits a zero
discount rate.  Thus, if domestic residents’ subjective probability of the reform program’s failure
(i.e., the probability of state of nature L) is denoted by p, the country’s welfare, W, could be
represented as follows:3
The country is a price/interest-rate taker in international markets, international investors
exhibit risk neutrality, and the riskless international rate of interest is zero.  Therefore, assuming
complete markets, the country faces the following budget constraint:
where  is the probability of the L state of nature according to foreign investors.
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Parameters p and  are the probabilities that domestic residents and foreign investors,
respectively, attach to the reform program’s failure.  Thus, they can be interpreted as the degrees
of “pessimism” or “lack of credibility” about the program’s success by domestic residents and
foreign investors.  A natural benchmark case is the one in which both sides share the same view
and, thus, p = .  Of the asymmetric cases, perhaps the most relevant is p < , i.e., domestic
residents are less pessimistic than foreign investors.  This would correspond to a situation in
which, for example, after several attempts and consequent declining economic welfare, the
populace becomes convinced that radical reform is necessary and give full political support for it
to be carried out.  However, if foreign investors focus more on portfolio diversification than on
closely following the country’s news, they are likely to stick longer to the outdated view that
reform is unlikely to take place.4
Maximization of welfare (1) subject to budget constraint (2) yields the following first-
order conditions:
and
where  > 0 is the associated Lagrange multiplier.
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The following Proposition is an immediate consequence of the above first-order
conditions:
Proposition 1.  If p = , then c = xs, s = L, H.  Furthermore,
and
The following Proposition refers to changes in social welfare as a result of changes in the
degrees of pessimism:
Proposition 2.  
Furthermore, there exists some number c > p (which may be a function of p), such that
Finally,
Proof of Proposition 2.  Follows trivially from the Lagrangean expression corresponding to the
maximization of utility (1) subject to budget constraint (2), and the Envelope Theorem. ~
In words, and in inverse order, by (10), in the benchmark case in which domestic
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residents and foreign investors share the same view, an increase in the degree of pessimism
lowers social welfare.  By (9), the same holds in a wide spectrum of cases in which foreign
investors are not “too pessimistic,” i.e.,  $ c.  Finally, by (8), assuming that initially domestic
residents are more optimistic than foreign investors–the relevant asymmetric case in which
 > p–then social welfare declines if domestic residents become more pessimistic.  However, the
implication is reversed if initially domestic residents are more pessimistic than foreign investors.5 
The overall conclusion is that in the relevant cases an increase in the degree of pessimism or lack
of credibility is likely to be detrimental to social welfare.
Consider now the case in which individuals are ‘unduly’ pessimistic.  More precisely, let
us assume that the government knows that the probability of failure is pG but domestic residents
and foreign investors are more pessimistic.  The question arises:  is there room for welfare-
enhancing government intervention?  There is no obvious answer to this question.  For, the
answer requires first deciding what is the relevant welfare concept under the present
circumstances.  If this is a one-shot game, then the relevant welfare concept would seem to be
(1), where probability p is the public’s subjective probability of reform’s failure which, by
assumption, is larger than pG.  Under this criterion the private sector maximizes social welfare
and there is no room for government intervention.  This does not mean that the government has
no role, though, since one of its key roles would still be to gain credibility and improve its
communication skills.
On the other hand, consider an artificial set up in which exactly the same reform
experiment is carried out in a large number of mutually stochastically independent locations. 
Then, by the law of large numbers, ex post individuals would be able to have an accurate
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estimate of the probability of reform failure.  Thus, if pG was right, then, looking back,
individuals would wish the government did something to correct their mistake, even though
intervention would not have maximized their expected utility at the time they made their
consumption decisions.  Thus, it could be argued that on the basis of ex post utility, the relevant
probability in evaluating social welfare is pG, not p.  I conjecture that this artificial example could
be adapted to an infinite-horizon set up with learning.  Assuming that the government is right,
then individuals will learn over time that the true probability of reform failure is pG.  Thus, again,
looking back, individuals would wish the government did something to correct their mistake.   
Notice that the same welfare concept would be utilized by a “paternalistic” government
that maximizes its own expected utility (and, therefore, utilizes pG instead of p).  
In the benchmark case in which p =  > pG, for example, by Proposition 1, ‘tomorrow’
consumption in the low output state would be too large with respect to ‘tomorrow’ consumption
if the state is high output.  Optimal policy under these conditions is summarized in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3.  Let p =  > pG, and the social welfare be given by
Then, the social optimum is achieved setting a state-contingent consumption tax s > -1, s = L, H,
such that 
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and taxes are rebated to the public in a lump-sum manner, i.e., at equilibrium, lump-sump
subsidies = sxs, if state of nature s = L, H, takes place. ~
Proof of Proposition 3.  The planner maximizes (11) subject to budget constraint (2) (where  =
p).  Therefore, the first-order conditions for this problem are
where G is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the planner’s optimization problem.
Under these circumstances, for the domestic resident the after-tax price for c is 1, for xL is
(1 + L)p, and for xH is (1 + H)(1 - p).  Thus, given (12), the individual will set
which equals the ratio obtained dividing (13 b) by (13 a), and (13c) by (13a), respectively.  From
this result and the tax rebate assumption the proof of Proposition 3 immediately follows. ~
Remark 1.  An implication of Proposition 3 is that the optimum is achieved by taxing
consumption when output is low–a politically unpalatable policy since the private sector would
be hit by low output and higher taxes–and subsidizing it, otherwise. ~
To summarize, when reform is output-enhancing, imperfect credibility is no ground for
government intervention, unless ex post expected utility is the relevant welfare concept, or the
government is paternalistic.
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III.  Trade Liberalization
Results are radically different if lack of credibility generates distortion as in Calvo (1986),
Calvo and Drazen (1998) and Mendoza and Uribe (1996).  Consider, for example, the case in
which the government lowers import tariffs to zero ‘today’ and promises to keep them low
‘tomorrow.’  However, domestic residents and international investors believe that there is a
probability p that the trade liberalization program will not be carried out into ‘tomorrow’ and,
instead, tariffs will be raised to  > 0.6  To focus on the distortionary effect of lack of full
credibility and abstract from fiscal considerations, we assume that the tariff is fully rebated to
domestic residents in the form of lump-sum subsidies.  
Output is constant at level y, domestic residents have no use for domestic output and,
thus, consumption entirely consists of imported goods.  Using the same notation as in previous
section, and identifying L with policy reversal, equilibrium lump-sum subsidies if state L occurs
equal xL / g, where xL is the market-determined consumption if, contrary to the policymaker’s
promise, the tariff is imposed.  Hence, under complete contingent markets and, again, assuming
that the international riskless interest rate is zero, the budget constraint for domestic residents is
given by the following expression:
Consequently, domestic residents maximize utility (1) subject constraint (15), which
yields the following first-order conditions:
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Proposition 4.  Let us assume state-contingent markets.  Then (1) y < c = xH > xL, and (2) c and xs,
s = L, H, are increasing functions of the degree of pessimism about the continuation of the trade
liberalization policy p. ~
Proof of Proposition 4.  The statement about the consumption pattern, c = xH > xL, follows
trivially from first-order conditions (16), (27) and (18).  The economy as a whole faces the
following budget constraint:
which, given the consumption pattern, requires c > y.
We will now turn to prove statement (3) in Proposition 4.  Since c = xH, we can write
equation (19) as








Figure 1 depicts equations (20) and (21).  The downward-sloping straight line corresponds to
budget constraint (20), while the heavy upward curve depicts first-order condition (21).  Initial
equilibrium is at point A.  The dashed curve is budget constraint (20) after p rises by p.  The
budget constraint pivots on the point c = xL = y.  Thus, as a result of p > 0, equilibrium shifts
from point A to point B, proving point (3) in Proposition 4. ~
Next we will discuss the effect of lack of credibility on social welfare (again assuming
that domestic residents and foreign investors share the same view, i.e., p = ).
Proposition 5.  Let us assume the existence of complete contingent markets.  Then, for a
neighborhood of full credibility, i.e., p = 0, an increase in the degree of pessimism about the
continuation of trade liberalization, p, lowers social welfare. ~
Proof of Proposition 5.  Consider the Lagrange expression associated with the maximization of
expected utility (1) subject to budget constraint (15).  Thus, totally differentiating the Lagrange
expression, taking into account first-order conditions (16)-(18), it follows that
Thus, by strict concavity of function u, we have that the expression in (22) is negative if p = 0
(recalling that xL < xH).  Proposition 5 now follows from continuity. ~
Remark 2.  The above proof cannot be extended to any p > 0 because, by Proposition 4,




inverse relationship between the degree of pessimism, p, and social welfare is very general.  For a
plausible range of elasticity parameters, the inverse relationship holds for values of  exceeding
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50 (i.e., tariffs of 5000 percent!).  Thus, again in this case, enhancing government’s credibility is
likely to be socially desirable. ~
Calvo (1986) shows that lack of credibility is tantamount to an intertemporal distortion,
from which it readily follows that government intervention–in the form, for instance, of controls
on capital mobility–is socially desirable, even though the welfare criterion is based on private
sector’s beliefs (recall the discussion in the previous section).  Now we will tackle a subtler
question, a key motivation for the present paper, namely, Is it optimal to limit state-contingent
markets when trade liberalization is not fully credible?  More specifically, we will study the net
social benefit of disallowing contingent markets. 
In the absence of state-contingent markets, ‘tomorrow’ consumption x is given by 
or,
By (1), (23) and (24), expected utility maximization by domestic residents is equivalent to
maximizing the following expression with respect to c (taking (23) and (24) into account):
Hence, in the absence of state-contingent markets, domestic residents’ utility maximization
yields the following first-order condition (noting that by (23) and (24) the equilibrium value of x
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is the same independently of the state of nature):
We are now ready to prove a central result of this section.
Proposition 6.  Let utility index u equal the natural logarithm function.  Hence, for 0 < p < 1, and
with no government intervention, social welfare is higher under no state-contingent markets than
under complete state-contingent markets.  If p = 0 or p = 1 then social welfare is the same under
the two market structures. ~
Proof of Proposition 6.  See Appendix.
Lastly, one can compute the income-equivalent welfare gains or losses from different
policies.  In the present quasi-static framework it is likely that these welfare gain/losses be small
(normally less than 1 percent).  This is actually confirmed by numerical analysis in the family of
iso-elastic utility functions.7  However, the welfare costs of contingent relative to non contingent
markets are significant.  For example, in the logarithmic case, if  = 25 percent and p = 20
percent, the above ratio is roughly 10.
IV.  Moral Hazard
The above discussion assumed that capital market contracts are fully honored and reform
probabilities are independent of those contracts.  One obvious extension is to allow for debt
repudiation, but the latter will not be analyzed here because the present framework has little to
add to previous findings.  Of greater interest is the possibility that the probability of reform be
endogenous and reflects the type of capital market contracts implemented at equilibrium.
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To illustrate, consider the model in Section II in which reform implies high output
‘tomorrow,’ while no reform implies maintaining present low output level.  By Proposition 1, in
the benchmark case in which domestic residents and foreign investors share the same view, i.e., p
= , then at equilibrium consumption will be the same irrespective of whether reform is being
carried out.  Domestic consumers would be completely insulated from the outcome of the reform
process.  Thus, if there is just a small social cost associated with reform, policymakers will have
no incentive to implement it!  Under these circumstances, the only rational expectations
equilibrium outcome corresponds to the case of no reform with probability 1, i.e., p =  = 1,
giving rise, by (10), to the worst-case scenario.  In contrast, if state-contingent markets are not
complete, and consumption if reform takes place, xH, exceeds consumption if it does not, xL, then
it becomes more likely that reform will be carried out.  Actually, if the marginal social cost of
reform is small, policymakers could be induced to reform with probability 1, i.e., p = 0, which
leads to a first-best scenario.  This suggests that a reason for not encouraging the development of
complete markets, especially in countries that lag considerably in terms of institutional
development, is that otherwise policymakers may loose their drive to push reform to full
fruition.8
Interestingly, however, the above result does not extend to the trade liberalization
example discussed in Section III.  By Proposition 3, under complete markets xH > xL which may
not interfere with reform if its marginal social cost is small enough.  Actually, incentive problems
would arise if there were no state contingent markets.  By (23) and (24), ‘tomorrow’
consumption is independent of whether trade liberalization is carried out.  Therefore,
policymakers may choose to eschew reform, i.e., set p = 0.  In the present economy social welfare
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is the same whether or not trade reform is undertaken.  This is so because the model has
abstracted from traditional static gains from trade.  Thus, complete and incomplete state-
contingent markets may lead to the same outcome in terms of social welfare.  Introducing static
gains from trade implies that even though income in terms of tradables would be the same
‘tomorrow’, irrespective of trade liberalization, ‘tomorrow’ utility index will be higher if reform
is carried out–thus breaking the tie in favor of reform.  Therefore, moral hazard problems
associated with complete markets seem to be less serious for trade liberalization programs than
for sheer output-enhancing ones.
V.  Conclusions
Economic reform is a complex process involving a few courageous technicians,
supported by visionary politicians, whose success depends among many other things on the
existence of appropriate exogenous conditions.  Therefore, one of the central difficulties faced by
reformists is lack of complete credibility in their ability or willingness to undertake a very
strenuous, and occasionally life-threatening, task.  It would, therefore, be surprising that
unfettered market activity should be socially optimal when policymakers’ credibility is at stake. 
The present paper confirms this view, either because the existence of a full set of markets would
magnify distortion, or because it may interfere with the reformists’ heroic drive.
Financial markets analysts probably just see the last stage of the game when they
recommend that emerging market economies open their doors to state contingent contracts.  With
complete markets, for example, domestic residents may be compensated for lack of reform and,
thus, they may ceteris paribus be better off than if they had bought no insurance.  But the ceteris
paribus assumption could be very strong.  The existence of contingent markets changes the
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nature of equilibrium.  Thus, looking at the last stage of the game is simply naive and may be
misleading.
Having shown that state-contingent markets could be socially costly does not
automatically imply that state-contingent contracts–especially those that are, implicit or
explicitly, contingent on reform’s success or failure–should be controlled or banned.  First, as
illustrated in the paper, gaining credibility is, as a general rule, welfare improving.  Moreover,
credibility is unlikely to be gained by blocking incentive-compatible financial contracts.  Second,
financial markets are hard to regulate; thus, otherwise redundant and complex financial
instruments are brought to life by skillful financial engineers as more familiar instruments are
banned or controlled.  Unsuccessful regulation also diminishes the policymaker’s credibility.
However, the paper raises a warning flag about policies that facili ate financial
engineering in reforming economies.  An underdeveloped financial sector can help maneuvering
transition, lowering the distortion costs of not-fully-credible policies.  The effective life of this
“window of opportunity” may be short but there is no clear reason why policymakers should not
want to take advantage of it.
In closing, it is worth recalling that the framework used in this paper is extremely simple
and unrealistic.  Its main contribution is to provide a first look at key issues that preoccupy
financial analysts and policymakers after the resurgence of capital mobility in emerging markets. 
The next obvious step would be to bring into the picture realistic financial considerations
(including moral-hazard issues associated with the existence of a ‘lender of last resort’) that, even
under free-market conditions, would prevent the existence of a full set of contingent markets.  In
that context, opening state contingent markets would be a much harder exercise in second-best
economics.  Hopefully, the present paper will help to shed some light on that intricate world.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 6
 By (15)-(18) the (ex ante) expected utility if markets are complete is given by
On the other hand, by (23), (24) and (26), expected utility if there are no state-contingent markets
satisfies
Note that expressions (27) and (28) are equal for p = 0 and p = 1, which proves the last statement
in Proposition 6.  Let us now take the difference between (28) and (27):
Hence,
Thus, (0) = (1) = 0 and, by (33),  is strictly concave.  Consequently,
which shows that welfare associated with the absence of state-contingent markets exceeds the
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one associated with complete markets if p  (0,1), and completes the proof of Proposition 6. ~
Remark 3.  It can be shown that, for the cases p = 0 and p = 1, the equivalence of the two market
structures holds for any function u allowed by our postulates.  This is intuitive because given that
domestic residents and foreign investors share the same expectations, each of those cases exhibit
no uncertainty and, thus, state-contingent markets are redundant.  Thus, if we define (p) as the
difference between social welfare under no state-contingent markets and under complete state-
contingent markets, (0) = (1) = 0.  Furthermore, it seems natural to conjecture the existence of
a “neighborhood” of utility indexes around the natural logarithm function such that for utility
indexes in that neighborhood, function  exhibits property (31), i.e.,
In words, for utility indexes close enough to the natural logarithm function, social welfare under
no state-contingent markets is greater than complete state-contingent markets.  We can make this
notion of “neighborhood” more precise and rigorously prove the conjecture if we confine
ourselves to the class of functions u uch that
The logarithmic case corresponds to  = 1.  Thus, one can show that there exists a neighborhood
around  = 1 such that if  belongs to that neighborhood, the corresponding function  satisfies
condition (32).9
Numerical simulations further show that to reverse the relationship expressed in
Proposition 6 it seems necessary for  to be lower than 0.1, which is considerably smaller than
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any empirical estimate of parameter .  Thus, we can safely conclude that if trade liberalization
does not enjoy full credibility, then allowing for state-contingent markets is likely to be
detrimental to social welfare. ~
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1. A common opinion by financial analysts is that Mexico’s crisis would have been cushioned if
market participants were allowed to “short” the peso, i.e., borrow in pesos, presumably to hedge. 
As the argument goes, at the time of crisis there would have been a group of players that were
contractually obligated to buy pesos, helping to prop up its value against the dollar and, thus,
slow down its steep decline.
2. In reality there seems to be no contract directly linked to the maintenance or discontinuation of
reform.  However, there are options and future contracts on exchange rates and other variables
that are themselves linked to reform.  Thus, these contingent contracts are proxies for the
contracts examined in this paper.
3. For technical reasons we further assume that function u is twice-continuously differentiable.
4. For a discussion of incentives to learn about a particular country in a globalized capital market,
see Calvo and Mendoza (1999).
5. The reason for this is that when p > , domestic residents choose xL > xH.  Recall that xL and 
are consumption and its price, respectively, if reform is abandoned.  Thus, when  ris s there is a
negative income effect.
6. To simplify the exposition, in this section I will assume that both domestic residents and
foreign investors share the same view of policy reversal, i.e., p = .
7. However, as shown in Calvo (1988), allowing for durable goods could greatly magnify these
costs.
8. It is worth noting that the tradeoff between insurance and efficiency under incentive-




9. The formal proof utilizes the fact that for  = 1, N(0) > 0 and N(1) < 0, and that these
derivatives are continuous functions of .
